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FOREIGN POLICY BRIEFING CONFERENCE
FOR BROADCASTERS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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[The meeting was reconvened at 2:20 p.m.]

MR. TUBBY: I hope you all had a nice leisurely lunch. You probably didn't by the time you got rushed up town or stood in the cafeteria line.

I have a couple announcements to make. One is that we have available--I guess some of you have already obtained them--the Q and A's on President Kennedy's Inter-American Program for Social Progress. If you don't have them, they are on the table outside. They were just run off this morning.

We also have outside in the lobby a panel of photographs which were taken last night at the Secretary's reception. I trust that many of you will find yourself in those photographs with the Secretary or others, and if you want a picture, if you would be good enough to give your name to one of the gals out there, with your address, we will send you one free print. Our resources are limited to that.

The ground rules will continue this afternoon, as before. No attribution to any Administration official, no direct quotes. With the President, he has indicated that he would like to speak OFF THE RECORD, so there will not even be what he says is "for your information only" and "not for your use" unless when he arrives he states otherwise. While he is here, I think it would be advisable not to use any of your recorders which you have been using

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during the conference for the taking of your own notes.

Our first speaker this afternoon is Allen W. Dulles, whom, as you all know, has long been Director of the vitally important Central Intelligence Agency. It gives me great pleasure to introduce Mr. Dulles.

[Applause]

The Role of Intelligence in U. S. National
Security and Foreign Policy.

MR. DULLES: Ladies and gentlemen, and members of the radio and television fraternity, it's a great pleasure to be here today. I don't do much public speaking, as you know. From time to time I do. I'm a pretty good listener. [Laughter] I find that it is a necessity, and also I will add a pleasure, to listen to your programs. I start out in the morning sometimes around half past 6 or half past 7 to find out what has happened during the night and I end up between 11 and 12-and I won't tell you what stations I listen to, but I try to spread my patronage around--[Laughter] but it's a fact that I don't feel that I can peacefully go to sleep or appropriately go to my office in the morning and answer the telephone calls unless I have been listening to you. You get your news generally quicker than I do. [Laughter]

You have the great advantage that it comes in clear and you don't have, well, sometimes maybe it doesn't seem so clear to you when you receive it, but at least you

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don't have to decipher it [Laughter] and then distribute it and then find someone has decided a particular thing that was the most important was the thing he thought ought to go to somebody else and not to you and even the boss doesn't get the material very often, I find. So that I am indeed grateful to you for helping me out by giving me information as to what's going on in the world.

I understand Mr. Tubby has said that my remarks are in a sense OFF THE RECORD in that they are not to be directly attributed to me, and that gives me more latitude. There are some secrets I'm not going to tell you. [Laughter] But I will speak from very informal notes and won't feel that I have to stick to any text in talking to you.

The CIA--and my job here is to describe to you in 15 minutes this organization--which you have heard of, grew out of our World War II experience, the old Office of Strategic Services headed by Wild Bill Donovan, a very great leader, a man of great genius. First he was the coordinator of information in the early days of the war and then they decided to divide up the informational side and the intelligence side and that division has remained, and you either have heard or will be hearing from Ed Murrow, who is the head of USIA, which deals with the overt information side and mine is the more covert, somewhat more esoteric I think more interesting [Laughter] side of intelligence which has a good many facets.

As I say, it grew out of World War II and our

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experience there. But even if there had been no World War II, with the world as it is, increasing up to a point where now we have I believe about a hundred independent states, it would, I believe, have forced the creation of some agency whose duty it was to try to find out the facts of what was going on in these various countries in order to lay those facts before the policy makers of government.

As one looks back, you know,--well, say we look back 10, 15 or 20 years--who would have thought that two of the four most serious crises areas today would be Laos and the Belgian Congo, the former Belgian Congo. I doubt whether, when I was in school, I was ever told where Laos was, and yet the frontiers of freedom are right there today. And in the Congo we have the challenging problem of how to take an area of that kind--I don't mean take in the physical sense, but take in the political sense of helping--and help an area of that kind to find a way towards the freedom that goes with a well-regulated government.

The other two areas that I would consider the most serious crises areas are the Berlin issue that hangs over us and, right at our doorstep, the tragic situation in Cuba. I hope you will all have a chance to read the White Paper on Cuba that was published this morning. That, I think, expresses as eloquently as a paper can express what the problem is there in Cuba.

Berlin is on the back burner, in a way, for the moment. But Khrushchev just keeps it there with the idea

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of bringing it forward and making use of it at any time. But there, too, in a way he is on the defensive because if one, as many of you have, goes to Berlin and sees West Berlin as contrasted with East Berlin, you see there a showcase of what an able and free people can do when allowed the benefits of freedom.

But now to get back to the organization of the CIA. It came in 1947. At that time the Department of Defense was set up, the National Security Council was created with a separate Air Force as a part of the Department of Defense, and the CIA was created under law. While we are often referred to as a secret organization, we have our legal charter. And after a long debate, many wise men, very able men, worked on it. In fact, the law that was drafted creating the CIA back in 1947, while it has been looked at from year to year, there never has been any substantive amendment found necessary to the general functions that were assigned to us under that law.

Our responsibilities under the law are to coordinate the government intelligence work that relates to national security, leaving to other separate agencies that are coordinated with us--such as the Army and Navy and Air Force intelligence--all their duties and functions and responsibilities within the technical fields which each of them represent.

Then we have the duty of the CIA, in coordination with other agencies, to prepare and disseminate intelligence

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reports and estimates to action officials. We can't make them read them, but may I say that the Daily Bulletin that we send out to the Departments of government, from the President down, which is very carefully prepared on an all-source basis to give the government an idea of what has transpired in the last 24 hours, that document now, I believe, is widely read in government. And I can assure you that it's read at the top of the government, because I often get telephone calls almost before I get to my office to explain one item or another that has ^{appeared} happened in that particular bulletin.

Then we have the duty of helping to give cohesion and purpose to the over-all intelligence effort. We try to see that in the collection of intelligence we are covering the field, trying to see that the assets not only of the CIA but of the military services, of the State Department, very importantly, that we are obtaining in this world of a hundred nations, that we are obtaining the information that is vital to us, that in the field of our relationships with the Soviet Union we are obtaining the information with regard to missiles, with regard to aircraft, with regard to submarines that is so essential to us in shaping our own defense program and in drafting yearly the various budgets.

And then, in addition to the various duties that were prescribed in the law of 1947 setting up the CIA, the legislators very wisely provided that the National Security Council could assign to the Central Intelligence Agency in

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this general field of intelligence such other services and duties of common concern as they might deem wise and appropriate. And, acting under that particular provision of the law, the National Security Council has from time to time given directives to the CIA as to the additional work we should do apart from the very specific functions provided under the law.

The Agency is independent of any particular department of government. It reports directly to the National Security Council and the President because the President is in a sense the National Security Council because the National Security Council is advisory to the President. However, through the representation on the National Security Council of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, the CIA receives policy guidance in its operations from those two high officials and has very, very close relationships both with the Department of State and with the Department of Defense, as I shall mention.

The authors of the legislation that I have referred to had the Pearl Harbor experience very much in mind. I don't subscribe to any of the sinister explanations of Pearl Harbor. However, I do think that that was a clear instance where the machinery to deal with the intelligence available to us did not properly function. The information did not get to all of the parties who should have had it quickly and in a form which gave an appraisal of what the intelligence means. And I feel that one of the

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reasons for the Pearl Harbor disaster was in a sense the failure of the functioning of intelligence.

Of course we are not the only country where there have been failures of that kind. There are many notable examples of it. The Kaiser back in 1914, when he went to war, misjudged under the advice of his ministers the whole temper of the British people. He found himself in a war that he had not calculated upon. He felt he could have a war on one front and he found he had a war on two fronts. That miscalculation was at the base of the defeat of Germany in World War I and there was at the base of it a miscalculation in the field of intelligence.

Hitler in 1939 again miscalculated in somewhat the same way partly based on misinformation, partly based on stubbornness. In 1941 intelligence failed him with regard to the Soviet Union and ^{its} ~~his~~ defense potential. In 1943 there was another miscalculation on the part of Hitler that vitally affected the progress of the war when he was advised by his intelligence officers, in part at least, about the Anglo-American landing in Africa. But it didn't reach him in a form that persuaded him of its truth.

And we had our own miscalculation. It has been debated back and forth at the time of the Chinese attack across the Yalu River. There was a very interesting intelligence objective, ~~see~~. There was a situation where there was no miscalculation as to the potential of the enemy, the position of the enemy's forces, the size of the enemy's

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forces. The problem was what was the potential enemy going to do. And in intelligence we are perpetually plagued with that problem. We may be correct with regard to the power of the potential enemy, but we may not be in a position and oftener are not in a position to say how the enemy is going to use that power.

In these very days now we may have to be considering what will be the attitude of the Chinese Communists in the Laotian situation. That is not an easy answer for an intelligence officer to give. But that is the kind of a problem we have to face.

The new machinery of intelligence coordination is based around a committee which is called the United States Intelligence Board. In fact, I have just come at 1 o'clock from a three-hour meeting of that committee. We meet every week, regularly. We meet more often when there are crises. On that Board, of which I am the Chairman, there are represented the senior intelligence officers of the State Department, of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the representative of the Department of Defense, of the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission has an intelligence officer.

At that meeting, with our experts we review every week the crises situations in the world, go around the world to see if there is a crisis that maybe some of us have some intelligence on that ought to be considered. We review old

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crises situations. We discussed late this morning the Laotian situation, for example, the Cuban situation and others. And then we go over national estimates, estimates of likely developments in various situations in the world. This morning, for example, we were studying a disarmament paper, as to what the probable attitude of the Soviet Union might be in the field of disarmament. When those papers are finally agreed, then they go to the policy makers, the President, and the other policy makers of government, particularly the Secretary of State and the high officials of the Department of Defense and they become the basic, factual papers on which policy is considered.

In addition, at this Board we try to see whether there are gaps in our intelligence that should be filled by a particular action, if there are areas of the world that we are not adequately covering, some one of the members of us, and we try to see that there is absence of duplication, because the CIA is not by any means the only intelligence organization in the field. One of the greatest collectors of intelligence, of course, is the Department of State and our Ambassadors and representatives around the world in the diplomatic service, extraordinarily able people in those jobs. And the Army Attachés, Navy Attachés, Air Attachés are collecting intelligence. But I can say now--and I don't think people hold out on me very much--all of that intelligence flows in through a single channel, so that we have a chance to see a well-related

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picture of what's going on in the important countries of the world.

And then we have a watch and sort of alert machinery. We have a committee called the Watch Committee which meets also on a weekly basis to review any indications that there is a threat to the peace of the world or the peace of the United States in particular, are there any movements of any nature in the Soviet Union, Communist China, any Communist penetration in Cuba, anything of that kind.

And back of the Watch Committee is an Indication Center, and into that Indication Center which is manned on a 24-hour basis there come all the cables and all the messages and all the indications which might indicate a growing crisis, particularly in our relations with the Communist bloc. And that Indication Center is keyed into the watch officers of the various intelligence agencies. I have a watch officer, or several watch officers, who are on duty around the clock. I can call up any time--and I do it, not to see whether they are awake or not, but because I want to get some information. I call them up every two or three days, sometimes call them up very late at night and say, "What's the situation?" In five minutes they will give me a rundown on the information that has come in. And the Army, Navy and Air Force have a similar watch office. The State Department has a similar watch office. So, while we are all human, we all can make

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mistakes, I do believe that we have got the machinery that is ready there to alert us to any particular crisis.

Now, we in a sense have the easy problem. But we have to pass on to the President and Dean Rusk, Secretary McNamara and the others and theirs is the duty to say what ^{they} are ~~you~~ going to do in this situation. It's easier for a doctor to prescribe and tell what the disease is than to cure it. We are not policy makers in the Central Intelligence Agency. We are information officers. And, while occasionally every once in a while in drawing up our estimates we get near to the fringe of policy because we say if you do so-and-so and so-and-so something is going to happen, or if you don't do something something is going to happen, that tends to influence the direction of policy.

But we are by no means perfect. We have been caught by surprise. But we are not caught by surprise quite as often as some of you people in the press and radio and television say we are. Any time anything happens that hasn't been advertised before, then you say there again intelligence has been caught by surprise. But we can't tell you all this when we predict that a revolution is going to break out in two or three days in country X. We can't, unfortunately, advertise that. And so very often we have warned the policy makers of an up-coming event but we have not told the press. So when the event comes, we can't then say, "Well, we told everybody all about that."

I have been criticized very severely for not having

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predicted the Suez difficulty, when there was first the Israeli and then the British and French invasion of Suez. We did predict that beforehand, very clearly. We said, "This is going to happen." But after this happened, we couldn't come out then--I'm doing it now, but I have not done it before--we couldn't have come out and said we were all right on that. The policy makers were already warned.

Now, there were times when we were caught napping. Iraq, we didn't know about Iraq before, but neither did the Iraqi, neither did the British or anybody else. [Laughter] And so you can't have a perfect record. Looking back on it, if we had had the proper man in touch with the proper division of the Iraqi army at the proper time we might have known about that particular coup. But it really came about pretty largely by accident because a certain division was sent into Baghdad when it shouldn't have been and it carried out the revolution.

But we are not thinskinnyed any more. We deserve a certain amount of criticism. We get maybe more than we deserve. But, on the whole, I must say I think the press, radio and television have been unusually kind to us in the CIA as a new agency of government--that is, new as compared with the old line agencies.

Furthermore, intelligence is no longer an exact science. There is room for dissent, and in our estimates if there is anyone who dissents from the view of the majority, that always is included in the estimate. I don't

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believe--one thing I have learned in drawing up these estimates, I don't believe in trying to find nice language that bridges over a fundamental difference of view. I believe in sharpening up the differences so that the policy makers can see that on a certain point there is a difference of view, that the information has been interpreted in different ways.

You have heard something, probably, about a missile gap. I don't propose to get into this missile gap, unless you ask me questions about it, and then I shall probably evade them [Laughter], but there are honest differences of views as to how many missiles the Soviet Union has, and I don't think that any amount of argument is necessarily going to bridge that particular gap. We have created a gap ourselves to some extent, and I don't mean in failing to produce, but because of the difference of interpretation of the same information.

Science is taking a greater part in our work. We collect much information by various means, by very scientific means. To the ladies here I regret, and, as I have said before, sometimes it seems to me that it's unfortunate that radar and all things of that kind are somewhat taking the place of the Mata Hari's. It takes away some of the glamour of intelligence. I don't know whether it adds to its precision or not. [Laughter]

Another problem we have in intelligence is the fact that all human beings are creatures of prejudice. We

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all think, a great many of us think, we have no prejudices. Well, I can assure you we all do have prejudices. One of the reasons though for creating the Central Intelligence Agency to centralize and coordinate intelligence here in the Government is that we haven't had any particular axes to grind. We are not responsible for any policy and therefore if we see some information that goes against the policy that is in existence we have no inhibitions. If you are wedded to a policy, you get very stubborn and you don't look at facts that say that the policy isn't the best one, particularly if you invented it. [Laughter]

And where it comes to missiles and aircraft and things of that kind, one runs across--and it is perfectly natural, if you are a member of the Army, Navy or Air Force you have certain prejudices for the particular weapons you wish to use and for which you need money through appropriations. There is no dishonesty in that. That is the kind of a prejudice that is inherent in human beings. In the CIA I can't say we are without prejudice. We probably have our own prejudices, but we don't have certain built up prejudices that may exist in other branches of the government.

By and large, I may say that in our United States Intelligence Board we have an extremely happy and cooperative family and we are working together on a highly cooperative basis and I want to pay tribute to the State Department intelligence and to the military intelligence and other intelligence agencies of this government. They are all doing,

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I think, a very able, outstanding job.

I have about used up my time, but there is one other point I really wanted to bring up before we opened it up to questions. In addition to our various responsibilities in the field of intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency has a particular responsibility to the threat presented by international Communism. Khrushchev again and again, here in this country and again in speeches, has said that Communism is going to take over the world. It will be done peacefully. It will bury us, yes, but he doesn't mean he will physically put us in the ground, that we will really bury ourselves because his system is better than ours, so he boasts. And he has a very unique and powerful apparatus which he believes, short of war and without resort to the atomic bomb, can be used in this burying process. And it is this apparatus that is one of the targets of our intelligence activities.

There are 80-odd, 87 Communist Parties in the world, practically one for every country. Some of these are recognized and are given semi-respectability, unfortunately, in some countries. Sometimes they are underground. But they are there. By and large, they are all directed from Moscow or in some cases from Peiping. They had a meeting last November, you may recall, in Moscow where over 80 Communist Parties were represented there. They discussed the Chinese problem. But these conferences are also used to indoctrinate the various Communist leaders

as to their particular policy. They get financial help. They get strengthening. They get advice. And they get a form of leadership. And if one goes back to the Twenty First Party Congress in February of 1959--we know about this, and we have authentic reports on it--the directives that were there given to the Communist Party of Cuba are the very directives that are being carried out in Cuba today and the backbone of the policy of Castro. And, whether or not he was a Communist at that time, that is immaterial. He has since then followed out those directives and we know what those directives were. And we know when the Cuban Communist Party received them.

In addition to these 80-odd Communist Parties, there are all manner of front organizations. They have the World Federation of Trade Unions, a Communist organization in labor, the World Peace Federation which met in Mexico the other day and had a few hundred Communist leaders there from all over Latin America. They have an orchestrated apparatus, many players and many instruments and many tools, but all directed toward trying to take over the free world. And I believe that it's through finding out the objectives of this apparatus and not directly but in other ways through USIA and other means, trying to get out to the public of this country and to the world what the apparatus is, what its purposes are, how it works, we can help to undermine and to make it fail in its purposes.

And with this I will turn the meeting open to questions.

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Q Do you have a comment about the recent coming in of this Communistic material through the Post Office Department and also about the Supreme Court decision of allowing Communists here in America to have passports?

MR. DULLES: Did you hear the question, one related to the Communist material coming in through the Post Office, and the other the question of allowing Communists to have passports.

Both of these are a little bit out of my field. I don't think the Communist material that is coming in is going to hurt very much. The only thing I regret is that it is going to cost a lot of money to cart it around the United States. But I don't feel that it's going to hurt us very much. It doesn't have much effect in this country.

I'd rather not comment on the Supreme Court's decision on the Communists getting passports.

Q Mr. Dulles, could you tell us how the CIA goes about determining whether an organization is a Communist front organization, and also whether the Fair Play for Cuba Committee has been labeled as a Communist front organization.

MR. DULLES: I have nothing to do with the determination of whether an organization goes on the Attorney General's list. The Communist front organizations, the international ones, are quite well known. The question of determination in this country is a matter for the Department of Justice. I have my own views about this Cuban organization, but I haven't really studied the evidence on that.

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Q Mr. Dulles, is it possible for you to give us the latest from Laos?

MR. DULLES: There has been nothing in the last few hours of any great significance from Laos. [Laughter] It's a very, very tricky situation. And it's going to be a very tough one to handle.

I want to go way back there [indicating back of the room] because I have been favoring those in front. Yes?

Q I don't know whether you could answer this, sir, but is it possible to state whether Castro got his, or was familiar with the so-called final plan while he was still in the mountains? This is a point which has never been clarified in anybody's mind.

MR. DULLES: In the final Communist plan--I don't know whether you heard the question, whether Castro received his advice from Moscow when he was in the mountains February '59. Yes, it would have been presumably well before he--no he took over Havana in--

Q January.

MR. DULLES: January 1, 1959. It was just about that time. The meeting took place, as I recall, in February of 1959, to which I refer.

Q Sir, many--

MR. DULLES: Yes? Excuse me for pointing but it is the only way I have.

Q Many people in this country were not even aware that there was a Central Intelligence Agency until

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the U-2 incident burst upon us. In retrospect, would you play this a little differently now?

MR. DULLES: Well, I never believe in being caught. [Laughter] [Applause] However, the intelligence that was obtained from the U-2 has been, I believe, of inestimable value to the security of the United States. And, as an intelligence officer, I have no regrets except the fact that we were caught.

Now, let me see--I think over here [Indicating].

Q Mr. Dulles, would you care to do a little advertising in terms of your national estimate on what the Red Chinese might do in Laos if, for instance, they were on the ceasefire committee?

MR. DULLES: We haven't made an estimate yet. We will probably be called on for one pretty soon.

Q Mr. Dulles, the advocates of a Central Intelligence Group, which might seemingly do away with the military intelligence groups, based their predication on the fact or the allegation that military estimates of intelligence are bent to exercise their desires. In other words, the Air Force might say, "We need more aircraft because", or the Navy says, "Well, our intelligence reports insist they need"--do you feel there is a need for a single intelligence unit?

MR. DULLES: The question is whether there is a need for a single intelligence unit because of the possibility that military intelligence might be slanted. I have

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tried very discreetly to refer to that in my direct remarks. The way we do it now, we all sit down around the table and we workout our estimates in that way. Now, I don't believe that the military deliberately slant their estimates. I think they are very honest in their estimates. They have honest and very strong feelings, and one often finds too that one's service estimate will be different than another service's estimate, so that you have a kind of countervailing weight there in estimating. But I'm very glad to have differing estimates and strong reasons for these estimates because they may well be right.

We take those into account in our final estimate we prepare. And if there is a dissent, as I said before, that dissent in the estimate is clearly indicated in a footnote. So one knows that the Army, Navy or maybe the State Department dissents on a particular point from the estimate, for which I myself have responsibility. I have to turn in the estimate finally so that somebody decides. But there may be dissenters from my view and very honest dissenters. We never have difficulty over that.

Q Mr. Dulles, can you tell us--

MR. DULLES: Just let's have this one [Indicating]. I will give you next chance.

Q Can you tell us, Mr. Dulles, what intelligence operations cost the American taxpayer in the current fiscal year, as an example?

MR. DULLES: That is pretty highly classified.

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[Laughter] And also is a figure very difficult to get at because you first have to work out what is the definition of intelligence. Now, for example, would you include the entire diplomatic service? They are putting in intelligence estimates every day. A great deal of their time is spent on putting in intelligence estimates. Do you include the Map Service of the Army? Do you include this or that? We have great difficulty of stating exactly what is included in this term intelligence for the purpose of a budgetary accounting. I know how much money I get. But I'm not going to tell you. [Laughter]

Let's see, I think this one over here [Indicating].

Q Would you give us your estimate of the activities of the John Birch Society or similar groups within this country, as to how they affect both in terms of security and our international relations?

MR. DULLES: The question was addressed to me about the John Birch Society. Under the law I have no internal security functions. That is entirely in the hands of the Department of Justice and the FBI. If you want my personal opinion, since they called me a Communist, I don't like 'em. [Laughter] [Applause]

I think this one [Indicating] Have you asked a question yet?

Q No, I have not.

MR. DULLES: Excuse me, I'm sorry.

Q You mentioned that the U-2 information was of

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inestimable value to us. Are we now in a gap as far as that intelligence is concerned? Have we done anything to fill that gap?

MR. DULLES: I'm afraid that to answer might be of value to the enemy. I shall not answer it.

Q Mr. Dulles, are you satisfied with the level of sharing on intelligence information among our allies, as between the United States and friendly nations?

MR. DULLES: We have very friendly relations with a large number of intelligence services throughout the world and I find that they are very ready and willing to share, particularly in those areas relating to international Communism which is, as I have said before, one of the most important of the areas.

Let me see, I think I have been favoring one side. I'll take this one [Indicating]

Q Mr. Dulles, could you give us an indication as to whether or not your organization is backing one of the Cuban exile groups with money and help? [Laughter]

MR. DULLES: The question is whether we are backing one or more of the Cuban exiled groups. I understand that there are over a hundred of these groups and even if I were backing one, I don't think I would give you that information.

Q You spoke a good bit about our intelligence efforts. Could you evaluate the Communist intelligence efforts of us?

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MR. DULLES: The question is as to whether I could evaluate the Communist intelligence on the United States. They have a fairly easy time of it because all they need do is read the newspapers, the reports that are made to the Congress for the budget and otherwise, and they get a pretty good idea of our military posture. It's very hard to keep that secret. There are a few things that we keep secret but not very many. I wish my own task in Russia were as easy, as relatively easy, as their task was here. As to how good they are, sometimes they seem to be quite inept. I'm quite sure we seem the same to them at times.

Q Mr. Dulles, on the basis of your last observation, as to the ease with which Russian agents may read the newspaper or hear the radio and get vital information, does it follow that you would favor the imposition of some restrictions on these reporting media?

MR. DULLES: No, I do not. Because I think that liberty, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of radio and television is more important, even though it may give some information to the enemy; that is, weighing the two, I would rather retain the freedoms that we have without crippling restrictions even though it has some benefit to the enemy.

Q Mr. Dulles, the implications of the RB-47 incident seems to be that there is something going on in the upper reaches of Russia. Can you tell us what the RB-47 was looking for, if it was a specific development.

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MR. DULLES: The question is as to the nature of the mission of the RB-47. That is a matter in the hands of the military and is a classified matter. I don't think there is anything particularly significant about the place where it was. But the mission is a classified matter.

If anybody has asked a question, I'd rather you would not ask another one.

Q. What is your opinion of the proposal that is occasionally made to create a joint committee in the Congress on intelligence as a watchdog over the CIA?

MR. DULLES: I think that the Congress ought to decide itself the committee method which it desires to use with regard to the CIA. I may say that I now have the duty to report to a series of committees. There is the Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, the Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, often the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of the two Houses. So I do report. I went up, I think, last year 26 times to the Congress and the general idea that I won't give Congress the time of day is not correct. [Laughter] I appear before them quite often, and practically always when they ask me to appear.

Now, it is handled--and I may say that it's handled with extreme care, and if I appear in Executive Session, in the ten years that I have been appearing before the Congress there has not been a serious leak insofar as any intelligence briefings are concerned. That is a very

There is somebody way in the back I'll take now.

Q What is the CIA's assessment of Castron when everybody was rooting for him?

MR. DULLES: What was the CIA's estimate of Castro when everybody was rooting for him. It wasn't as wise as it might have been. [Laughter] Castro had around him initially a lot of very able, very fine people, who really hoped that the purposes of the revolution and those purposes for Cuba were quite sound, as they were published back at the time of the initiation of the revolution. Those purposes were quite sound, as was clearly brought out in the White Paper that was published this morning. I think we were all taken in, a great many of us were taken in, by the fact that Castro adopted and ran and fought on that platform. He has now completely deserted it. He has driven out practically everybody except the hard-boiled Communists who started with him, and I think he has turned Cuba into a Communist state.

Q Sir, I understood Mr. Berle to say that the revolution was somewhat sidetracked by the Communist influence and thus we have what we have today. I also gathered from him that he felt there is some hope that this revolution may still go ahead and achieve its ultimate purpose. How is this possible if Communism has a real firm hold on Cuba? How could it be any more likely to happen than it did in Hungary?

MR. DULLES: That is a rather long question and I

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didn't hear Mr. Berle today. He is a great friend of mine. We worked together for many, many years. But I think I would find it difficult to answer that question without knowing what Mr. Berle said, because as far as I know his views and mine about Cuba are very much the same, as I have discussed them with him many, many times. I'm afraid I'll have to leave it that way, not having heard exactly what he has said.

Just one more question. Is there any lady who wants to ask a question? We have had the men here and we haven't got any questions by any ladies. [None]

Q Can you tell us, Mr. Dulles, how soon you expect China to have nuclear capability?

MR. DULLES: That is a matter of guesswork. It depends on a great many things. It depends on how much aid the Soviet Union may give. If the Soviet Union gives considerable aid, it might be quite soon. If they have to do it on their own, it will be somewhat later. It's not right around the corner, but it's not, I would say, six or seven years old. Somewhere between the two. [Laughter]

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. My time is up.

[Applause]

MR. TUBBY: Before I introduce the next speaker and General Wheeler, I would like to say^{to} a number of broadcasters who are staying over tomorrow and would like to visit the Voice of America studios, we have made arrangement